Pricing Models for On-Demand Computing by Huang, Ke-Wei & Sundararajan, Arun
Pricing Models for On-Demand Computing
Ke-Wei Huang1 and Arun Sundararajan2
Working Paper CeDER-05-26, Center for Digital Economy Research
Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University
November 2005
Abstract: On-demand computing provides a new way for companies to manage and use their IT
infrastructure. This model of corporate computing radically changes the way companies pay for their
IT infrastructure, basing it on "pay per use" rather than on the fixed infrastructure investments such
companies are accustomed to. A clear theoretical understanding of pricing on-demand computing
is thus central to the viability and growth of this nascent industry. We contribute towards such an
understanding in this paper by modeling the optimal pricing of on-demand computing while taking
four critical factors into account: the costs of deploying IT in-house, the business value of this IT,
the scale of the provider’s on-demand computing infrastructure, and the variable costs of providing
on-demand computing. Three distinct pricing models emerge as optimal among all possible pricing
functions for on-demand computing. These models describe when volume discounting, free usage
and demand caps should be used to manage demand appropriately and profitably. We also outline
a likely path that the transformation towards on-demand computing will follow — under which low-
usage customers are targeted initially, followed by a broadening of the market, and finally, a focus on
profiting from inducing adoption by high-usage customers — and prescribe how the associated pricing
models should evolve appropriately3.
JEL Codes: D42, D82, L12, L86.
144 West 4th Street, KMC 8-185, New York, NY 10012. khuang0@stern.nyu.edu
2 44 West 4th Street, KMC 8-93, New York, NY 10012. asundara@stern.nyu.edu
3We thank seminar participants at New York University for their feedback. The usual disclaimers apply.
1 Introduction
The emergence of on-demand computing promises to transform the way corporations buy and
manage their IT infrastructure. This model of computing, also referred to as "utility com-
puting", or in the specific context of software, as "apps on tap", may shift IT infrastructure
from being a fragmented capital asset to being a centralized utility service. The viability of
on-demand computing has been facilitated by two related technological developments — grid
computing and Web services. Together with the widespread availability of Internet bandwidth,
they make it technologically feasible for corporate buyers to "rent" key parts of their IT in-
frastructure — servers, data storage, isolated software applications, and integrated software
solutions, for, among other things, salesforce management, CRM and retail fulfilment — from
large-scale utility providers, rather than deploying and running these parts of their infrastruc-
ture in-house.
Current spending levels for on-demand computing are still a small fraction of IT corporate
budgets; however, this fraction is widely projected as growing rapidly over the next decade.
During this nascent stage in its evolution, it is essential for providers of on-demand computing
develop and implement pricing and migration strategies that make the transition appropriately
gradual and reliable. An inappropriate choice of pricing that is based on usage could either
lead to excessive inertia in migration, or alternatively, to excess demand that providers cannot
fulfil profitably or scale to meet reliably. Either scenario could easily kill early innovators in
on-demand computing.
The importance of a careful and judicious choice of pricing models, critical during this
transition in corporate computing, motivates our paper’s objective: to develop robust prescrip-
tions for pricing on-demand computing. We identify and model four aspects of corporate IT
infrastructure that affect it’s pricing:
(1) The cost of buying, deploying and maintaining the infrastructure in-house: Since this
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option is always a viable substitute for on-demand computing, the magnitude of its cost will
play an important part in pricing on-demand computing.
(2) The business value of the infrastructure: Often, the business value of different kinds of
IT infrastructure varies widely, based on its functionality and the context in which it is used,
and this variation is not always directly related to its cost. Providers of on-demand computing
are likely to price based on business value or willingness to pay, while their customers may be
accustomed to thinking about paying for the infrastructure based on its cost.
(3) The scale of the provider’s on-demand computing infrastructure: The seller’s primary
instrument to control demand is its pricing model, which needs to be designed to ensure that
its infrastructure is not under-utilized, while also maintaining an acceptable level of quality-
of-service and reliability, both of which can be compromised by excessive demand. Linking
infrastructure scale to pricing is therefore important.
(4) The variable costs of on-demand computing: Even after accounting for the costs of
infrastructure, on-demand computing services are not "information goods". Rather, their pro-
vision involves non-trivial variable costs that relate to customer service, billing and monitoring.
Additionally, adopting customers may bear variable costs of transition, and of usage, that are
independent of price.
Our analysis of optimal pricing for on-demand computing incorporates each of these four
factors, and yields three different optimal pricing models, each of which characterizes a distinct
stage of transition in corporate computing. These models may feature volume discounting, free
usage for high-demand customers, and demand caps. The emergence of a range of nonlinearity
in the optimal pricing policy validates our approach of choosing to place no restrictions on the
choice of pricing function, despite the associated analytical complexity of this approach.
We are also able to characterize which model is suitable based on the stage of evolution
of an infrastructure industry towards the on-demand model, and suggest a path of transition
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pricing for an IT industry making the transition. In the early stages of transition to on-demand
computing, our model prescribes an optimal pricing strategy designed to attract lower-usage
customers, by offering demand-capped pricing that draws in those companies who lack the
scale to implement their own in-house solutions. In an intermediate stage, as providers gain
confidence in the viability of the on-demand computing model, a pricing strategy which features
limited free-usage to some higher-usage customers is optimal. This strategy will induce a
measured expansion into the middle of the market (which, although seemingly related, is quite
different from the "move to the middle" hypothesis of Clemons, Reddi and Rowe, 1995), while
continuing to profit from the lower-usage customers attracted early in the process. As the
on-demand computing model matures, and the fixed costs of in-house deployment rise as a
consequence, pricing is likely to become more "normal": aimed at a broad segment of high-
usage customers, with volume discounts and no artificial caps on demand. Our model also
suggests that the sectors of the IT industry that make the transition earlier are likely to be
those whose impact on an organization’s core business value is not as substantial.
Our work extends the literature of nonlinear pricing with positive participation constraints
(Lewis and Sappington 1989, Maggi and Rodriguez 1995, and Jullien 2000) and the literature
about on-demand computing. The former literature is quite vast, a survey is beyond the scope
of our paper, and we therefore focus on placing our work in the latter (and related) literature.
Gurnani and Karlapalem (2001) develop a monopoly pricing model to examine the optimal
pricing strategies for selling and pay per use licensing of packaged software over Internet. Their
main contribution is to show that pay per use is indeed a profitable alternative for software ven-
dors. Snir and Hitt (2003) investigate bidding behavior in early-stage markets for IT services,
theorizing that such bidding contains important information about the viability and value of
these markets early in their evolution, and finding that services with higher value do indeed at-
tract a larger set of bids. Paleologo (2004) presents a methodology for pricing utility computing
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that takes risk into account, and reports on how it improves on simple cost-plus pricing models.
Chen andWu (2004) model a seller’s choice of linear usage-based pricing for on-demand comput-
ing, and Bhargava and Sundaresan (2004) study how to use contingent auctions to price utility
computing. Our paper also adds to a growing literature in information systems that study
second-degree pricing discrimination for IT-related goods and services. This literature includes
Nault (1997), who analyzes pricing and profitability when an interorganizational system can
lead to quality differentiation based on whether or not a good is supported by the IOS, and
relates these measures to the optimal design of the IOS for both a monopolist and competing
duopolists., Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) who show that bundling information goods is often
profitable, Geng, Stinchcombe and Whinston (2005) who show that pure bundling may not be
optimal when the value each customer places on different goods in the bundle varies sufficiently,
Bhargava and Choudhary (2001) who establish conditions under which versioning is optimal,
Weber (2001) who analyzes when mixed versioning is optimal, Anand and Aron (2003), who
derive a monopolist’s optimal group-buying schedule and compare its profits with those that
obtain under the more conventional posted-price mechanism, and Sundararajan (2004) who
establishes the optimality of fixed-fee pricing for information goods.
Our paper differs from this stream of literature in the following key ways. First, we ex-
plicitly model the presence of a "build-your-own" option, which while possibly less relevant for
information goods, is clearly a critical aspect of a corporation’s choice of IT infrastructure, and
consequently, of a seller’s pricing model for on-demand computing targeted at such corpora-
tions. Second, we explicitly model the effects of the seller’s choice of infrastructure levels: in
other words, we recognize and incorporate the fact that while their costs at the margin may of-
ten be zero, on-demand computing services are not really information goods: increasing supply
often necessitates discrete and costly increases in infrastructure. Third, we explicitly model the
choice of a pricing function, rather than imposing a linear pricing function ex-ante. Our results
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show that the structure of this pricing function can vary significantly at different phases in
the industry’s evolution, and can include volume discounts, free usage and demand caps, none
of which would emerge in an analysis of linear pricing. This highlights the importance of our
generalization. Our model is similar in some respects to the model in Sundararajan (2004b),
which studies optimal nonlinear pricing in the presence of piracy, since both models study price
discrimination in the presence of an outside alternative whose value depends on customer type.
What distinguishes our model is that the outside alternative for on-demand computing involves
payments for fixed infrastructure, thereby significantly changing the way surplus varies across
customer type, and leading to a broader family of pricing functions that emerge as optimal.
We do not explicitly model queuing effects or congestion costs. Beginning with the seminal
paper by Mendelson (1985), there is a rich literature in IS that studies the effects of such costs
on pricing. These include Mendelson and Whang (1990) who demonstrate that priority pricing
for a constrained resource can be expressed in a simple form: a base price for the lowest class
plus an increasing priority surcharge; Dewan and Mendelson’s (1990) analysis of congestion
pricing with general delay costs, Dewan’s (1996) discussion of declining computing costs on the
tradeoff between capacity costs and user time, Konana, Gupta and Whinston’s (2000) model
of dynamic priority pricing with congestion premiums, and Afeche and Mendelson (2004) who
model interdependent delay costs and consumer value. Granted, congestion costs are certainly
pertinent to the provision of on-demand computing, and we do not ignore them entirely. Instead,
we translate such effects into a shadow cost imposed by the level of infrastructure, based on an
implicit assumption of a constant level of quality of service. By abstracting congestion costs in
this way, we can focus on modeling of other aspects of pricing on-demand computing that have
not received as much attention in the IS literature.
We have organized the rest of this paper as follows. Section 2 presents our model which
characterizes the demand for computing, the cost structure of on-demand and in-house de-
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ployment, and formulates the pricing problem for a seller of on-demand computing. Section
3 presents the solution to this problem. It describes three distinct pricing models, each of
which is optimal across a different range of combinations of average business value from the
service, and the relative fixed and variable costs of in-house and on-demand deployment, and
discusses the distinct characteristics of each of these models. Section 4 summarizes our results,
discusses a possible path of transition towards on-demand computing and the corresponding
pricing models that will accompany it, and outlines directions for future research.
2 Model
This section briefly describes our model of the costs and value from on-demand computing, and
concludes with a characterization of the pricing problem that is solved in Section 3.
2.1 Overview
We model a computing or IT infrastructure service, henceforth simply referred to as the service,
that is used by different customers in varying quantities. These customers are heterogeneous
in how much they value a specific number of units q of the service (a couple of examples are
provided later in this section that illustrate what these units might be for different kinds of on-
demand computing). Specifically, each customer is indexed by a parameter θ that determines
the value u(q, θ) that the customer derives from using q units of the service, and which we
assume takes the following functional form:
u(q, θ) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
α[θq − 1
2
q2], q ≤ θ
α[1
2
θ2], q > θ
, (1)
where α is a service-specific parameter that models how much business value customers derive
from the service, on average. This specification of u(q, θ) implies that the parameter θ represents
the maximum demand a customer indexed by θ has for the service, and, for a fixed value of α,
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is also indicative of the marginal business value the customer derives from an increase in their
demand for the service. We assume that θ is known only to the customer (that is, it cannot be
observed by a seller), and that it is uniformly distributed2 on the interval [0, 1].
To fulfil their demand for the service, customers have two options. The first option is to
buy, implement and maintain the infrastructure required to fulfil the service in-house, from an
established market for in-house fulfilment of the service. A customer who chooses this option
incurs a fixed infrastructure cost of F , and this option enables the customer to fulfil their entire
computing needs3.
The second option a customer has is to fulfil all or part of their demand from a monopoly
seller of an on-demand version of the service. This seller chooses a pricing function P (q) that
specifies the price that a customer will pay for their usage of q units of the service. Since
the seller cannot observe the type θ of any customer, this pricing function is available to all
customers. A special (familiar) example of a pricing function might be a linear price P (q) = pq,
and a natural question at this stage is whether additional insight can be gained by allowing
the seller to choose a more general pricing function. Our results in Section 3 will show that
linear pricing is never optimal for the seller: the pricing model chosen will feature increasing
volume discounts, demand caps, free usage for high-usage customers, or some combination of
these factors.
Our model easily generalizes to a scenario in which there are a few distinct segments in which
customers across segments differ in terms of their scale (thus incurring a segment-specific cost of
in-house computing F ), so long as the seller can identify what segment a customer belongs to,
2Our choice of utility function and distribution are for analytical simplicity. The pricing structures we derive
are likely to generalize in their structure to a more abstract model, although establishing this will involve
substantial additional analytical complexity.
3In a different context, this may be interpreted as an "all you can use" price for a tangible version of a digital
good now being priced as a service.
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but faces some residual incomplete information about specific customers within each segment.
For example, a seller may be able to identify whether a potential corporate customer is a small
business or a Fortune 500 company, or may have a rough estimate of how many employees or
customers a company has; this information is indicative of both the customer’s willingness to
pay for the service, as well as the scale of costs they incur to deploy in-house computing. So
long as a customer’s segment can be identified, the seller will simply independently design a
different pricing schedule for each segment according to our results in Section 3, and offer only
that schedule to customers in the segment. To that extent, our assumption of one segment with
a common cost of in-house deployment F is without much loss in generality.
The seller deploys a fixed level of infrastructure, represented by the vectorK = (k1, k2, ..., kn).
The components of infrastructure could include hardware, software licenses, disk storage, cus-
tomer support infrastructure, administration and maintenance staff, and so on. The fixed cost
of this infrastructure is sunk and therefore does not affect the seller’s choice of pricing, although
the level of K does affect pricing through the constraint it places on a seller’s ability to fulfil
demand. The seller also incurs a linear variable cost c ≥ 0 per unit of demand it fulfils from
this shared infrastructure. This cost may be incurred due to transaction costs associated with
billing, usage monitoring and customer support, or may include costs associated with integrat-
ing the service with other parts of the customer’s existing in-house IT infrastructure. The
seller also guarantees a fixed level of quality-of-service to each of its customers, which restricts
the aggregate level of demand that it can fulfil at a choice of infrastructure K to a maximum
of Q(K). The function Q(K) is (weakly) increasing in each component of K (a higher level
of infrastructure leads to a higher maximum demand). Our specification of infrastructure is
analogous to the idea of IOS design used in Nault (1997), where the vector K of infrastructure
is similar to his vector −→x of IT inputs, which are mapped to IOS quality using a production
function ξ(−→x ) Beyond this, it is not necessary to make any assumptions about its functional
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form, and the connection between K and the seller’s choice of pricing will be made clear at the
beginning of Section 3.
To illustrate the variables of the model further, consider the example of on-demand access
to a grid of high-performance servers. The units of q in this example could be the number of
processor-hours that the customer uses (this is the basis for Sun Microsystems’ pricing of access
to their grid, for example). F would represent the cost of acquiring and administering a high-
performance server in-house, and Q(k1) would represent the maximum number of processor
hours that, say, a grid with k1 nodes can support. A second example might be on-demand
access to Amazon’s retailing platform. The units of q in this second example could be the
number of (some standardized) transactions the customer fulfils using Amazon’s platform. F
would be the cost to the customer of buying, setting up and running the hardware, application
and database server software, and other infrastructure required for the in-house fulfilment of
online retailing, and Q(K) would represent the maximum number of non-Amazon (partner)
retail transactions Amazon.com can support under its current infrastructure level K.
2.2 The trade-off between in-house and on-demand corporate computing
Once the pricing schedule P (q) is set, for a customer of type θ, the surplus from a choice of
on-demand deployment is:
max
q
[u(q, θ)− P (q)], (2)
and the surplus from a choice of in-house deployment isµ
max
q
[u(q, θ)]
¶
− F. (3)
Therefore, customers segment into a maximum of three groups, based on the absolute value
of their surplus from each option, as well as the relative values of surplus between options. The
first group chooses on-demand computing, and will consist of those customers whose type θ is
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such that their net value from on-demand computing is positive, and is higher than their net
value from in-house deployment:
max
q
[u(q, θ)− P (q)] ≥ 0. (4)
max
q
[u(q, θ)− P (q)] ≥
µ
max
q
[u(q, θ)]
¶
− F. (5)
For simplicity, we assume that indifferent customers choose on-demand computing. The second
group chooses in-house deployment, and will consist of those customers whose type θ is such
that their net value from in-house deployment is positive, and is higher than their net value
from in-house deployment:µ
max
q
[u(q, θ)]
¶
− F ≥ 0. (6)µ
max
q
[u(q, θ)]
¶
− F > max
q
[u(q, θ)− P (q)]. (7)
The third group of customers will be those whose net value from either option is negative, and
who therefore do not deploy the service at all.
The seller’s pricing problem is to choose the pricing function P (q) that maximizes its profits,
given that its demand will be from the set of customers whose type θ satisfies (4) and (5), that
each customer in this set will generate demand according to (2), and that total demand fulfilled
cannot exceed Q(K). We transform this formulation into a simpler one to facilitate solving it,
and the mathematical details of this transformation are presented in Appendix A.
3 Pricing models for on-demand computing
In this section, we present the seller’s optimal pricing schedule. It takes the form of being
one of three different pricing models. We describe each model and relate its choice to the
seller’s cost structure, infrastructure choices, and the business value customers generate from
their usage of the service. We present our results as a sequence of three pricing models for
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clarity, and to be able to highlight the features of each that are relevance to pricing in practice.
However, rather than being specific structures (or functional forms) we have exogenously chosen
to study, these are the pricing functions that our analysis establishes as optimal among all
possible pricing functions, and across all feasible combinations of the model’s parameters. That
is, we analyze all possible combinations of parameters, and derive the optimal pricing function
for each combination of parameters. To make our exposition clearer and easier to understand,
and towards trying to make sure that the implications of our results do not get buried in the
complexity of the math that our analysis entails, we have then partitioned the parameter space
(as summarized in Figure 1) based on structural similarities we identify within different optimal
pricing functions. Appendix B presents the mathematical details of our analysis and contains
all of our proofs.
3.1 A preliminary result: relating infrastructure levels to pricing
Our first lemma is an intermediate result that relates the seller’s choice of infrastructure K to
their pricing problem.
Lemma 1 The seller’s pricing problem with the constraint Q(K) on demand is equivalent to
the same pricing problem with no constraint on demand, but with linear variable costs c+λ(K),
where λ(K) measures the "shadow" cost of using one unit of demand fromQ(K), and is (weakly)
decreasing in each component of K.
This result allows us to view the seller’s infrastructure constraint as being equivalent to
bearing an additional (variable) shadow cost λ(K) that is linear in total demand. There is
always an infrastructure level for which this cost is zero. This is at a point where the seller can
fulfil its unconstrained profit-maximizing level of the demand. None of the results that follow
(for instance, the presence of demand caps) rely critically on the presence of this "capacity"
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Adjusted variable cost [ ( )] /+c Kλ α
F
α
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0
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Volume discounting without demand caps 
Region 2
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moderate caps
on demand 
Region 3
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with restrictive demand caps 
0
No market for 
on-demand computing 
Figure 1: Summarizes the three pricing models for different average business value, cost and
infrastructure levels. Each of these models is discussed in more detail later in this section. The
analytical details of each of the curves that define this partition are summarized in Table 1.
constraint — rather, it simply allows infrastructure K to affect pricing, if in fact the level of K
constrains demand.
Our next three results describe the seller’s optimal pricing schedule under different combi-
nations of c, λ(K), F , and α. The regions of the parameter space under which each is optimal
are summarized in Figure 1, and the exact expressions defining these regions are summarized
in Table 1. Notice that these are exhaustive, accommodating all feasible positive combinations
of F, c, λ(K) and α.
3.2 Model 1: Volume discounting targeted at high-usage customers
Our first proposition describes the optimal pricing model in region 1:
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Region Restrictions on parameters
No demand
F
α
≤ 1
2
µ
c+ λ(K)
α
¶2
Region 1
F
α
≥ max
(
1
4
,
Ã
1
2
− 4
9
∙
1−
µ
c+ λ(K)
α
¶¸2!)
Region 2
1
4
≥ F
α
≥ 4
µ
c+ λ(K)
α
¶2
, c+ λ(K) ≤ 1
4
Region 3
1
2
³
c+λ(K)
α
´2
≤ F
α
≤ min
½
4
³
c+λ(K)
α
´2
,
µ
1
2
− 4
9
h
1−
³
c+λ(K)
α
´i2¶¾
Table 1: The analytical details of the regions mapped in Figure 1
Proposition 1 In region 1 of the parameter space, when the cost of in-house deployment is
high (relative to the service’s business value of the service), the seller’s optimal on-demand
pricing schedule involves gradual volume discounting targeted at inducing high-usage customers
to adopt. Specifically, the pricing function takes the form:
P (q) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
α
∙µ
[c+ λ(K)] + α
2α
¶
q − q
2
4
¸
for
F
α
≥ 1
2
−
µ
α− c− λ(K)
2α
¶2
α
"Ã
1−
r
1
2
− F
α
!
q − q
2
4
#
for
F
α
<
1
2
−
µ
α− c− λ(K)
2α
¶2 (8)
The region of the parameter space under which Model 1 is optimal is illustrated in Figure 2.
The pricing model in this region is "normal" in a sense: it involves no caps on demand, and a
gradually increasing level of volume discounting. Notice that in the region above the dotted line,
the pricing function does not depend on the fixed costs of in-house adoption. This is because
the cost advantages of on-demand computing are sufficiently high (or alternatively, the costs
of in-house deployment are sufficiently large) that the constraint placed on the seller by the
presence of the in-house deployment alternative are no longer relevant, and pricing is according
to standard unconstrained nonlinear pricing. Clearly, this will occur only if either the variable
cost c of providing on-demand computing is low, or the seller has deployed a relatively high
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Figure 2: Illustrates the region of the parameter space under which Model 1 is applicable. The
"in-house" deployment constraint does not bind above the dotted line, and pricing in the region
above the line is according to the first line of the equation (8).
level of infrastructure (which would make λ(K) relatively low), or both. However, the fraction
of customer types who will adopt on-demand computing is concentrated among high-usage
customers.
Below the dotted line, the alternative of in-house deployment begins to affect pricing. How-
ever, it is still optimal for the seller to price in a manner that targets all high-usage customers,
although at a progressively lower per-unit price. Notice that in this case, the variable price
P (q)
q
= α
"Ã
1−
r
1
2
− F
α
!
− q
4
#
is strictly decreasing as F/α decreases because when developing in house becomes more attrac-
tive, the seller has to offer deeper discounts.
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3.3 Model 2: Attracting a subset of high-volume users with free usage
Our next proposition describes the optimal pricing model in region 2:
Proposition 2 In region 2 of the parameter space, when the business value of the service is high
relative to the cost of in-house deployment, but the adjusted variable costs [c+λ(K)] of providing
on-demand computing are low, the seller’s optimal on-demand pricing schedule involves gradual
volume discounting at low levels of usage, free usage beyond a threshold, and often, a (relatively
high) demand cap. Specifically, the pricing function takes the form:
P (q) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
α
"r
F
α
q − q
2
4
#
for q < 2
r
F
α
;
F for 2
r
F
α
≤ q ≤ min
½
1,
F
c+ λ(K)
¾
.
(9)
The region of the parameter space under which Model 2 is appropriate, along with the
general shape of the pricing function is illustrated in Figure 4. The pricing function therefore
has upto three distinct regions. For low levels of usage, pricing is relatively standard, with a
steadily increasing discount. However, at a threshold value of demand per customer, the seller
stops increasing their total price, and offers free usage beyond that point. Notice that it is
important for this segment of free usage to be targeted at the higher-usage customers — that
is, those who have paid for their usage of the first [2
p
F/α] units of usage — rather than it
being offered as "use k units for free up front and then start paying" schedule. This is because
its purpose is to get the high-usage customers to find the on-demand computing alternative
at least as attractive as their in-house alternative, while still being able to attract sufficient
numbers of low-usage customers.
In the region above the dotted line of Figure 3 (on the left), the demand cap (F/[c+λ(K)])
from line 2 of equation (9) is non-binding — that is, it is higher than the maximum level of
demand from any customer type. However, below this dotted line, this "demand cap" becomes
binding. This is because in this region, the firm no longer finds it profitable to induce the
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Figure 3: Illustrates the parameter region under which Model 2 applies, and the corresponding
pricing function in this region. The demand cap illustrated in the pricing figure on the right is
only present in the region of the parameter space below the dotted line .
highest-usage customers to adopt on-demand computing — their variable costs are too high to
profitably offer usage beyond the usage level (F/[c + λ(K)]) while still charging a maximum
total price F . The pricing strategy therefore transitions towards being focused on the "middle
of the market", and away from the higher end. This is a trend that is accentuated further in
Region 3, as described in our next proposition.
3.4 Model 3: Inducing limited adoption by low-usage customers
Our next proposition describes the optimal pricing model in region 3:
Proposition 3 In region 3 of the parameter space, when the business value of the service is not
very high relative to the cost of in-house deployment, and the adjusted variable costs [c+λ(K)]
of providing on-demand computing are high, the seller’s optimal on-demand pricing schedule
involves gradual volume discounting at low levels of usage, and a very restrictive demand cap.
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Specifically, the pricing function takes the form:
P (q) = α
∙µ
[c+ λ(K)] + αγ
2α
¶
q − q
2
4
¸
for q <
γ2 − ( c+λα )2
2 (c+λ)α
, (10)
where γ is a positive root of the equation
4
(c+ λ)
α
bθ(γ)− (γ + c+ λ
α
)2 = 0; (11)
bθ(γ) = γ + (c+ λ)
α
−
√
2
2
r
(γ +
c+ λ
α
)2 − 4F
α
. (12)
While we do not have a closed-form solution for the equation, it is not essential for us to
describe the structure of the pricing function. We have also performed extensive numerical
analysis to study the extent to which the demand cap varies, and find that indeed, it is quite
restrictive, allowing participation by only a subset of customer types.
The pricing function and relevant region are illustrated in Figure 4. The intuition for this
demand cap is quite straightforward — it is due to the fact that the adjusted variable costs are
high relative to the cost of in-house fulfilment. As a consequence of these high costs, the seller
cannot profitably sell its service to the higher-usage customers while still ensuring that its price
is below their outside alternative (in-house development). However, it can sell profitably to
those customers who cannot afford the in-house alternative at all — these are the lower usage
customers. Clearly, without a demand cap, a price that is affordable to these customers would
also be attractive to the higher usage customers, and consequently, in order to profit the most
from their sales to these customers, the structure in (10) emerges.
Our final proposition defines the region of the parameter space for which on-demand com-
puting is not profitable:
Proposition 4 There is no demand for on-demand computing if and only if Fα <
1
2
( c+λα )
2.
In this region, the cost of providing on-demand computing is high enough relative to the
cost of in-house deployment to render its provision unprofitable for any customer type.
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Figure 4: Illustrates the region of the parameter space under which Model 3 is applicable, and
the corresponding optimal pricing function. The value of the demand cap increases as adjusted
variable costs [c+ λ(K)] decrease, that is, as either variable costs fall or the limits on demand
fulfilment imposed by infrastructure are relaxed.
4 Discussion, a possible path of transition and concluding remarks
As described in the brief discussion following the propositions, each of these three pricing
models is optimal for a specific set of relative levels of average business value, variable cost,
seller infrastructure, and fixed cost of in-house deployment. The sequence of pricing models
that a seller will use, and correspondingly, the set of customer segments they target with their
pricing strategy, depends on how these relative levels change over time.
Figure 5 summarizes a possible trajectory for the maturing of on-demand computing. In
the years before technological advances in grid computing and Internet access made the model
viable, it was clear that the variable costs of on-demand computing were too high to base a
viable business around it, and the region in which it is not viable is reflective of this. Next,
consider an industry in which the average business value α is relatively high. In the early stages
of evolution of an industry’s transition to on-demand computing, provider scale will be relatively
low, and additionally, the variable costs of administering its provision are likely to be relatively
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high, prior to any economies of scale that arise out of learning by doing. As a consequence,
it seems likely that providers will be in region 3 at this stage. Our model prescribes that
their optimal pricing strategy should be designed to attract lower-usage customers, by offering
demand-capped pricing that draws in those companies who lack the scale to implement their
own in-house solutions. In fact, there may be another reason for this approach early in the
process: it gives providers the opportunity to gain expertise and "iron out the kinks" in their
provision models without running the risk of a high-profile failure that could stifle a nascent
industry.
As the variable costs of provision fall over time, and providers are sufficiently confident in the
longer-term viability of the on-demand computing model to invest in sufficient scale to decrease
λ(K), the industry is likely to transition into region 2. During this phase, providers should
design their pricing strategy to slowly expand the middle of the market, towards eventually ful-
filling demand from higher-usage and larger corporate customers. Our model recommends that
this expansion can be implemented most profitably by offering limited free-usage to customers
whose individual demand exceeds a pre-specified level. This ensures that sellers can continue
to profit from the lower-usage customers they have attracted early in the process, while being
an economically viable alternative for these larger customers they are slowly drawing in.
Finally, as an increasing fraction of companies begin to transition to an on-demand corporate
computing infrastructure, it is likely that the fixed costs of in-house deployment will rise, owing
to the shrinking of the IT industry segments that support this kind of in-house provision.
Indeed, a similar transition in cost structure occurred in the electricity provision industry in
the early 20th century4. Prior to the widespread availability of centralized utility-based power,
4Our analogy has only to do with the similarity in cost structure, and unlike Carr (2005), we do not imply
any similarity in the importance of IT and electricity to business. It is clear that the latter general-purpose
technology, information technology, actually becomes progressively more important as shared infrastructures
(like those supporting widespread on-demand computing) become available (Dhar and Sundararajan, 2005).
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Figure 5: Summarizes a possible path of evolution to on-demand computing in an infrastructure
industry with relatively high average business value, and the corresponding transition in pricing
models and customer adoption that our model prescribes for this path. The solid line depicts
a slower pace and transition through all three models, which is likely for IT infrastructure with
higher average business value α relative to its costs and which is more tightly integrated with
a customer’s business, while the dotted line depicts a more rapid transition, more likely when
pricing IT infrastructure for which willingness to pay is closer to its cost of provision.
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many companies operated their own power plants. As the centralized power transmission and
distribution infrastructure matured, and more and more larger companies switched to buying
electricity on-demand (as the vast majority of them do today), the costs of setting up and
running one’s own dedicated power plant became prohibitively high. If the in-house IT provision
industry evolves in a similar way (where the change in cost structure will be driven largely by
the increasing cost of managing such an infrastructure in-house as they become progressively
less common), the industry will transition into region 1, and pricing is likely to become more
"normal": aimed at a broad segment of high-usage customers, with volume discounts and no
artificial caps on demand.
In contrast, for an industry in which the average business value α of the service is relatively
lower, the transition to region 3 may occur far more rapidly, since as indicated by our model,
it is the ratios [F/α] and [c+ λ(K)]/α that influence which region of the parameter space the
firm is in. For example, for lower values of α, and a comparable cost structure, the transition
is likely to be more rapid, and directly from region 1 to region 3. This leads to an interesting
and intuitive conclusion: that on-demand company is likely to be widely prevalent earlier in
those sectors of the IT infrastructure business which are less critically tied to a company’s core
value propositions. These are likely to be in commodity-like sectors such as web hosting, large
scale processing, and data storage. Other forms of computing more closely tied to a company’s
business and customers are likely to remain as a mix — large-scale in-house deployment coexisting
with on-demand alternatives for lower-end/mid-range customers — for much longer. Supply-
chain management and CRM seem like good examples.
Our analysis suggests many directions for future research. The model we have articulated
might apply equally well to a study of the optimal pricing of digital goods as a service; the
analogue of F would be the price of the tangible (or unlimited usage) counterpart. Indeed, such
usage-based business models are emerging in digital music and video. The prior literature (for
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instance, Sundararajan, 2004) has characterized how these usage-based and unlimited usage
options can coexist when offered by the same vendor. However, very little is known about
the pricing strategy for an entrant whose business model is based on separating a digital good
from its artifact and selling it as a service, when the level of F to be strategically varied by
the incumbent. Since such entry threats are likely to become more common over time, this
represents an interesting direction for further inquiry.
In order to focus our analysis on pricing structure, we ignore the possibility of peak-load
pricing (for instance, like in Oren, Smith andWilson, 1985) and of variability in the level of usage
of individual customers. These two issues are clearly related. An extension of our model that
accounts for these factors is a possible direction for future researchers, and an interesting one,
given that such pricing is widely used for electricity industry, although such pricing is probably
more important in the electricity industry, where adjusting "infrastructure" (the capacity to
generate power) is significantly more difficult.. A limitation of our model is that it does not
relate the fixed costs of in-house deployment to the scale of the customer explicitly. As we
argue in Section 2, this may not be a significant assumption if providers can design and offer
different pricing models for segments containing customers of differing scale. A generalization
might associate in-house deployment scale endogenously with cost (perhaps by relating it to θ),
although our analysis indicates that such a generalization is likely to be mathematically quite
challenging.
To summarize, we have presented a new set of models of pricing on-demand corporate
computing that explicitly take into account the relative business value of the infrastructure in
question, the fixed costs of in-house deployment, the variable costs of provision and the scale
of provider infrastructure. Our analysis shows that there are three distinct pricing models that
may be optimal for on-demand computing, each of which is likely to characterize a specific
stage in the transition. These pricing models may feature volume discounting, free usage for
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high-demand customers, and demand caps, and the emergence of these features validates our
approach of choosing to place no restrictions on the choice of pricing function, despite the
associated analytical complexity of this approach. We are able to characterize which model is
suitable based on the stage of evolution of an infrastructure industry towards the on-demand
model, and suggest a likely path for an industry making the transition. As more vendors and
their customers make this transition, further research on this increasingly important area is
natural, and something we hope to contribute towards.
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A Appendix: A precise formulation of the pricing problem
Given a choice of pricing function P (q), recall that the set of customers who adopt on-demand
computing are those whose type θ satisfies:
max
q
[u(q, θ)− P (q)] ≥ 0. (13)
max
q
[u(q, θ)− P (q)] ≥
µ
max
q
[u(q, θ)]
¶
− F. (14)
denote the subset of θ values which satisfy (13) and (14) as Θ(P ). The demand from a customer
of type θ ∈ Θ(P ) will be q(θ, P ), where:
q(θ, P ) ≡ argmax
q
u(q, θ)− P (q). (15)
The total demand that the seller receives is therefore:Z
θ∈Θ(P )
q(θ, P )dθ, (16)
and the seller’s total profits are therefore:Z
θ∈Θ(P )
[P (q(θ, P ))− cq(θ, P )]dθ. (17)
The seller’s problem is to choose the function P (.) that maximizes (17) subject to the constraintZ
θ∈Θ(P )
q(θ, P )dθ ≤ Q(K). (18)
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or, summarizing, the seller’s problem is
[P1] max
P (.)
Z 1
0
[P (q(θ, P ))− cq(θ)] dθ (19)
subject to
q(θ, P ) ∈ argmax
q
[u(q, θ)− P (q)] , (20)
max
q
[u(q, θ)− P (q)] ≥ max
∙
max
q
[u(q, θ)− F ] , 0
¸
, (21)Z 1
0
q(θ, P )dθ ≤ Q(K). (22)
The first constraint specifies that each customer chooses the quantity that maximizes his gross
surplus. The second constraint specifies that each buyer buys from the seller only if his surplus
from buying on-demand computing is higher than that from his alternative options which are
developing the service in-house or doing nothing (= 0). The last constraint specifies that the
seller cannot sell more than the capacity constraint allowed by his infrastructure resources, K.
Rather than considering all possible pricing functions, the revelation principle ensures that
the seller can restrict its attention to direct mechanisms–that is, usage-based contracts in
which one specific quantity-price pair is designed for each customer, and in which it is rational
and optimal for the customer to choose the quantity price pair that was designed for him or
her5. We can thus rewrite [P1] as [P1a].
[P1a] max
p(θ),q(θ)
Z 1
0
[p(θ)− cq(θ)] dθ (23)
subject to (24)
[IC]: q(θ) ∈ argmax
t
[u(q(t), θ)− p(t)] , (25)
[PC]: argmax
t
[u(q(t), θ)− p(t)] ≥ max
∙
max
q
[u(q, θ)− F ] , 0
¸
, (26)
[CC]:
Z 1
0
q(θ)dθ ≤ Q(K). (27)
Followed a standard transformation from the nonlinear pricing literature (Armstrong 1996),
define the surplus function as
s(θ) ≡ u(q(θ), θ)− p(θ), (28)
5This kind of formulation is standard in models of price screening–see, for instance, Armstrong (1996, §2).
A good exposition of mechanism design, the revelation principle, and its applications to pricing can be found
in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Chapter 7).
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and [P1a] can be rewritten as problem [P2]:
[P2] max
q(θ),s(θ)
Z 1
0
[u(q(θ), θ)− s(θ)− c · q(θ)] dθ (29)
subject to (30)
[IC1]: qθ(θ) > 0, (31)
[IC2]: sθ(θ) = uθ(q, θ) = αq, (32)
[PC] : s(θ) ≥ bs(θ) ≡ max ∙1
2
αθ2 − F, 0
¸
, (33)
[CC] :
Z 1
0
q(θ)dθ ≤ Q(K). (34)
Lemma 1 will show that [P2] is equivalent to the following formulation [P3], which is our final
one.
[P3] max
q(θ),s(θ)
Z 1
0
[u(q(θ), θ)− s(θ)− [c+ λ(K)]q(θ)] dθ (35)
subject to (36)
[IC1]: qθ(θ) > 0, (37)
[IC2]: sθ(θ) = uθ(q, θ) = αq, (38)
[PC]: s(θ) ≥ bs(θ) ≡ max ∙1
2
αθ2 − F, 0
¸
. (39)
For brevity later on, we have denoted the outside opportunity by bs(θ) . [P3] is an optimal
control problem in which q(θ) is the control variable, s(θ) is the state variable, [IC2] is the
equation of motion (dynamics), and which has two inequality constraints.
B Appendix: Proofs
Outline of the proof of Lemma 1
[P2] is called the isoperimetric problem in the optimal control literature (Seierstad and Syd-
sæster, 1987, Chapter 4). The Lagrangian or generalized Hamiltonian without the constraint
[PC] for this problem is6
HP2 = u(q, θ)− s(θ)− c[q(θ)] + λ[Q(K)− q(θ)] + μ[uθ(q, θ)]. (40)
Correspondingly, the Hamiltonian for [P3] without the constraint [PC] is
HP3 = u(q, θ)− s(θ)− (c+ λ)q(θ) + μuθ(q, θ). (41)
6We ignore the monotonicity constraing [IC1], later verifying for each case that our solution satisfies it.
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In Huang and Sundararajan (2005), we show that for any value of Q(K), there exists a unique
solution for λ, the marginal benefit of an additional unit of capacity. We further show that the
marginal revenue curve λ(K) is continuous and strictly decreasing. As a result, under most
general cost structures for Q(K) (including ones that are discontinuous and in "blocks") that
generate a relationship between infrastructure and the ability to fulfil a constrained level of
maximum demand, there exists a unique optimal solution of λ, and consequently, the optimal
solution of [P2] is equivalent to that of [P3].
The addition of the [PC] constraints (33) and (39) do not change the equivalence of HP2 and
HP3, since it involves the addition of the same term [μ2(θ)]
£
s(θ)−max{1
2
θ2 − F, 0}¤ to both
equations. While λ(K) is still decreasing, it is no longer continuous, which adds some technical
complexity, but does not change the idea above. A more detailed exposition is available on
request.
Outline of the proofs of our propositions
We first state the necessary conditions of our problem in Lemma (2). Next, we solve the case
when [PC] does not bind, in Lemma (3). We characterize the optimal solution of (q(θ), s(θ))
in Lemma (4), (5), and (6). We establish that q∗(θ) is a parallel shift of the solution to the
standard nonlinear pricing problem (which we refer to subsequently as the standard problem),
although s∗(θ) is somewhat different. Based on these lemmas, we can express the profit function
as a function of just one variable γ, the extent of this parallel shift. We find that there are
three cases that completely describe our problem, depending on which constraint is binding.
We characterize the optimal contract sequentially in Lemma (7), (8), and (9), and these lemmas
lead directly to our propositions.
Lemma 2 Define θ and θ as the lowest and highest customer types who adopt on-demand
computing. The necessary conditions for [P3] are:
∂HP3
∂q(θ)
= uq(q∗, θ)− (c+ λ) + μ1(θ)uqθ(q∗, θ) = 0,
⇒ q∗(θ) = θ + μ1(θ)− c+ λ
α
, (42)
μ1θ(θ) = −
∂HP3
∂s(θ)
= 1− μ2(θ), (43)
Transversality Conditions: 0 = μ1(θ) [s(θ)− bs(θ)] , (μ1(θ) > 0⇒ s(θ) = bs(θ)), (44)
0 = μ1(θ)
£
s(θ)− bs(θ)¤ , (μ1(θ) > 0 ⇒ s(θ) = bs(θ)), (45)
0 = HP3(q∗(θ), μ1(θ), θ), (46)
0 = HP3(q∗(θ), μ1(θ), θ), (47)
Kuhn-Tucker Condition: 0 = μ2(θ) · [s(θ)− bs(θ)] , (μ2(θ) > 0 ⇒ s(θ) = bs(θ)). (48)
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Proof. These conditions follow from the Maximum Principle, found in standard optimal
control theory textbooks (Seierstad and Sydsæster, Chapter 5, for instance). Equations (42)
and (43) indicate that the optimal quantity for each type will balance the sum of the marginal
benefit from this type and the cost this type imposes indirectly on account of higher information
rent to higher types. (44) to (47) are special in our problem since our boundary conditions on
θ and θ are endogenously determined rather than fixed. The participation constraint adds a
Kuhn-Tucker condition for this inequality constraint.
Lemma 3 (q0(θ), s0(θ)) is the optimal solution if and only if
(α− λ− c)2
4α
≥ 1
2
α− F, (49)
where
q0(θ) = 2θ − 1− (c+ λ)
α
, (50)
s0(θ) =
α
4
µ
2θ − 1− c+ λ
α
¶2
. (51)
This also defines the optimal pricing strategy when the buyer does not have the option of in-
house deployment (or the outside opportunity is zero for all buyers).
Proof. First, consider the solution to the problem in which bs(θ) = 0 for each θ. It is well
known that s(θ) = 0 (Mussa and Rosen,1978). As a result, we have one transversality condition
μ(1) = 0. The necessary and sufficient conditions of (41) reduce to
∂HP3
∂q(θ)
= α
¡
θ − q0
¢
− (c+ λ) + α · μ(θ) = 0,
⇒ q0(θ) = θ + μ(θ)− c+ λ
α
, (52)
μθ(θ) = −
∂HP3_0
∂s(θ)
= 1, (53)
s(θ) = 0, (54)
μ(1) = 0. (55)
Consequently,
μ(θ) = θ − 1, (56)
and thus
q0(θ) = 2θ − 1− c+ λ
α
. (57)
Since q0(θ) = 0, it follows from (44) that
θ =
c+ λ+ α
2α
. (58)
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The surplus function is thus
s0(θ) = 0 +
Z θ
θ
q0(t)dt =
α
4
µ
2θ − 1− c+ λ
α
¶2
. (59)
Also notice that the condition in (49) is equivalent to s0(1) ≥ bs(1). Recall the definition of bs(θ)
bs(θ) = 1
2
αθ2 − F, (60)
and it therefore follows that:
s0θ(θ)− bsθ(θ) = α
"
θ −
µ
1 +
c+ λ
α
¶2#
, (61)
which is strictly negative since θ ≤ 1. From (61), s0(1) ≥ bs(1) implies s0(θ) ≥ bs(θ) for all
θ ∈ [0, 1], and the solution to the standard problem is feasible for all θ, which proves the
necessary part. The sufficient part follows from the fact that if s0(1) < bs(1), [PC] is violated
for some θ ≤ 1.
Lemma 4 Define bθ ≡ min{θ : s∗(θ) = bs(θ) > 0}. If θˆ exists, then the optimal quantity and
price schedule takes the following form:
q∗(θ) =
(
2θ − γ − (c+λ)α , θ ∈ [θ,bθ)
θ, θ ∈ [bθ, θ], , (62)
or the optimal allocation to each type is either a parallel upwards shift of the allocation under
the standard problem (with γ < 1 representing the extent of this shift), or an allocation that
induces usage at the maximum possible level. Also,
p∗(θ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
α
4
µ
3
c+ λ
α
+ 3γ − 2θ
¶
q(θ), θ ∈ [θ,bθ)
F, θ ∈ [bθ, θ], , (63)
or the optimal price to each type is either the price under the standard problem adjusted for the
demand shift, or a price that replicates the cost of in-house deployment.
Proof. When θ < bθ, s∗(θ) > bs(θ) by definition. and hence μ2(θ) = 0 from (48). From
(43), this implies that μ1(θ) must take the form [θ − γ], where γ is an arbitrary constant (we
choose [θ − γ] rather than [θ + γ] since this makes γ positive later on). Substituting into (42)
yields the first line of (62), and the price schedule in the first line of (63) follows accordingly
based on the fact that
s∗(θ) = s∗(θ) +
Z θ
θ
αq(t)dt, (64)
p∗(θ) = U(q∗(θ), θ)− s∗(θ). (65)
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When θ > bθ, the seller cannot set s∗(θ) > bs(θ) since this violates [PC]. As a consequence, the
seller either chooses s∗(θ) = bs(θ), which can only be implemented by the quantity and price
schedule in the second line of (62) and (63), or excludes the customer type θ, in which case
θ > θ. The result follows.
Lemma 5 (1) s∗(θ) = 0, (2) q∗(θ) = 0, and (3) θ = 1
2
h
γ + (c+λ)α
i
.
Proof. (1) When θ = 0, it is not optimal to set s∗(θ) > 0. Next, suppose for some θ > 0,
the seller chooses s∗(θ) > 0. If this is the case, it follows that q∗(θ) > 0, and since the seller
sets a non-zero price,
u(q∗(θ), θ)− (c+ λ)q∗(θ) > 0, (66)
which, using the first line of (62), in turn implies
α
µ
θ − 1
2
q∗(θ)− (c+ λ)
α
¶
q∗(θ) > 0, (67)
or
γ − (c+ λ)
α
> 0. (68)
Consequently, there exists an ε > 0 such that θ − ε > 0 and q∗(θ − ε) ∈ (0, q∗(θ)). If the seller
chooses s∗(θ − ε) = 0, the profit from serving type θ − ε is
u(q∗(θ − ε), θ − ε)− s∗(θ − ε)− (c+ λ)q∗(θ − ε), (69)
which simplifies to
=
α
2
µ
γ − ε− (c+ λ)
α
¶
q∗(θ − ε), (70)
which is strictly positive for a small enough ε. Introducing this contract does not violate [IC2],
since it can be verified that
u(q∗(θ − ε), θ)− p∗(θ − ε) = αεq∗(θ − ε), (71)
and the RHS of (71) can be made smaller than s∗(θ) by choosing an arbitrarily small ε. There-
fore, including the customer types [θ − ε, θ] improves the seller’s profits, a contradiction, and
the result follows.
(2) Given s∗(θ) = 0, by (46), we have
u(q, θ)− (c+ λ) · q(θ) + μ1(θ)uθ(q, θ) = 0, (72)
where the last term in HP3 is dropped because of (48). After substituting the expression from
(62) and simplifying, (72) is equivalent to
1
2
q(θ)
∙
1
2
q(θ)− θ
¸
= 0, (73)
and the result follows since q(θ) ≤ θ under any pricing schedule.
(3) Follows immediately from the fact that q(θ) = 0.
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Lemma 6 θ = min
£
q∗−1( Fc+λ), 1
¤
, where q∗−1(θ) is the inverse of q∗(θ)
Proof. Given any q(θ), the highest level of profit feasible from type θ is
u(q(θ), θ)− [c+ λ(K)]q(θ)− uˆ(θ), (74)
which simplifies to
−1
2
α[θ − q(θ)]2 + [F − [c+ λ(K)]q(θ)]. (75)
If q(θ) > F/[c + λ(K)] , (75) is strictly negative, which proves that θ ≤ q∗−1( Fc+λ). When θ =
q∗−1( Fc+λ), we can show(later) that s
∗(θ) = sˆ(θ) except in the standard case. As a consequence,
by lemma (4), the profit is zero at θ. By assumption, the marginal customer is served and thus
θ = q∗−1( Fc+λ) when θ ≤ 1. Otherwise, θ = 1.
We can now rewrite the profit function in terms of only one argument, γ. We are going
to show that, with the exception of one case, separately analyzed in Proposition 3, there are
two regions of the profit function and the optimal value of γ is at the boundary of those two
regions. Define q∗(θ, γ) as the demand from a customer of type θ and s∗(θ, γ) as the consumer
surplus for type θ when the shift γ is chosen in (62). Correspondingly, following Lemma 4,
define θˆ(γ) = min{θ : s∗(θ, γ) = s(θ)}. Define the following critical values of γ:
γ1 = min{γ : s∗(θ, γ) = sˆ(θ)} (76)
where γ1 is the lowest such value for some θ ∈ [0, 1], and
γ2 = γ : s
∗(1, γ) = sˆ(1). (77)
The value of γ1 in (76) may not always exist. In the cases that follow, the variable γ0 will take
the value either γ1 or γ2 and we will show they are the solutions. Our problem is therefore to
maximize π(γ) with respect to γ, and has the following cases, which we label based on their
eventual solutions:
Case 1: (α−λ−c)
2
4α2 ≥
1
2
− Fα (standard pricing): The solution is stated in Lemma (3).
Case 2: (α−λ−c)
2
4α2 <
1
2
− Fα and
F
α ≥ min(
c+λ
α ,
Ã
1
2
− 4
9
∙
1− c+ λ(K)
α
¸2!
)7 (non-standard
with possible free usage, and no demand cap): The profit function has two regions:
Region 1, when γ ≥ γ0,
π(γ) =
eθ(γ)Z
θ
[u(q∗(θ, γ), θ)− [c+ λ]q∗(θ, γ)− s∗(θ)] dθ +
1Z
eθ(γ)
[u(θ, θ)− [c+ λ]θ − bs(θ)] dθ, (78)
7With these constraints, we can verify that the solutions satisfy all constraints. Fα ≥
c+λ
α comes from θ ≤ 1
within region 2 and Fα ≥
1
2
− 4
9
∙
1− c+ λ(K)
α
¸2
comes from p(q∗(1))− [c+ λ(K)] q∗(1) ≥ 0 in region 1.
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Region 2, when γ < γ0,
π(γ) =
min[1,(γ+ c+λα +
F
c+λ )/2]Z
θ
[u(q∗(θ, γ), θ)− [c+ λ]q∗(θ, γ)− s∗(θ, γ)] dθ. (79)
The upper bound comes from lemma 4 and 6. When Fα ≤
1
4
8 , γ0 = γ1 (case 2A), and when
F
α >
1
4
, γ0 = γ2 (case 2B). The intuition is that when γ is smaller, q∗(θ, γ) is larger and s∗(θ, γ)
is greater than bs(θ) for each θ. As a result, there exists a threshold value of γ, whose value is
γ1, such that the objective function changes its shape. At the same time, the constraint bθ(γ)
≤ 1 leads to Case 2B, with the threshold determined by bθ(γ) = 1.We will show that the profit
function is increasing in region 1 and decreasing in region 2. As a consequence, we will have a
corner solution at γ∗ = γ0.
Case 3: Fα < min(
c+λ
α ,
Ã
1
2
− 4
9
∙
1− c+ λ(K)
α
¸2!
), (non-standard pricing with a demand
cap): Again, we have two subcases:
• Case 3A: When 2(c+λ)α ≤
q
F
α , the profit function has two regions, analogous to those in
case 2. For γ ≥ γ0,
π(γ) =
eθ(γ)Z
θ
[u(q∗(θ, γ), θ)− [c+ λ]q∗(θ, γ)− s∗(θ)] dθ +
F
c+λZ
eθ(γ)
[u(θ, θ)− [c+ λ]θ − bs(θ)] dθ,
(80)
and for γ < γ0,
π(γ) =
min[1,(γ+ c+λα +
F
c+λ )/2]Z
θ
[u(q∗(θ, γ), θ)− [c+ λ]q∗(θ, γ)− s∗(θ, γ)] dθ, (81)
where γ0 = γ1.
• Case 3B: When 2(c+λ)α >
q
F
α , the profit function has three regions, and its discussion is
deferred to the proof of Proposition 3.
These cases are mapped out onto our parameter space in Figure 6 to make the connection
with the Propositions clearer.
We now proceed to show that:
• Case (2A): bθ(γ) < 1, γ1 < 1
8 F
α ≤
1
4 comes from
bθ(= 2qFα ) ≤ 1 in region 2.
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Figure 6: Mapping of our cases in the Appendix to the regions of the parameter space that
each case describes the solution to.
• Case (2B): bθ(γ) > 1, γ2 < γ1 < 1
• Case (3A), bθ(γ) < F/(c+ λ), γ1 < 1.
• Cases (2A), (2B) and (3A): The profit function is increasing for all γ < γ0, and the profit
function is decreasing for all γ > γ0.
We summarize these proofs in the following three lemmas.
Lemma 7 When (α−λ−c)
2
4α <
1
2
α− F and γ < γ0, π(γ) is increasing in γ.
Proof. Independent of whether γ0 = γ1 or γ2, when θ = 1, the profit function in (79)
simplifies to
π(γ) =
α
12
µ
2γ − 1− c+ λ
α
¶ ∙
γ +
(c+ λ)
α
− 2
¸2
. (82)
Differentiating with respect to γ and simplifying yields
πγ(γ) =
³α
2
´
(1− γ)
µ
2− γ − (c+ λ)
α
¶
. (83)
the second term is positive because γ ≤ 1 is a standard result (Jullien 2000) and the third term
in parenthesis on the RHS of (83) is positive because q∗(1, γ) > 0.
34
A similar computation of the profit function in (79) when θ = (γ + c+λα +
F
c+λ)/2 yields
πγ(γ) =
αF 2
8 (c+ λ)2
, (84)
which is strictly positive. The result follows.
Lemma 8 When (α−λ−c)
2
4α <
1
2
α− F and γ > γ0, π(γ) is decreasing in γ.
Proof. We first identify bθ(γ), the marginal type whose participation constraint is binding,
given γ. This is the value of θ which solves s∗(θ, γ) = bs(θ), and this equation reduces to:
α
4
µ
2bθ − γ − (c+ λ)
α
¶2
=
1
2
αbθ2 − F, (85)
which yields: bθ(γ) = γ + (c+ λ)
α
−
√
2
2
r
(γ +
c+ λ
α
)2 − 4F
α
. (86)
Next, we compute the following partial derivatives.
∂bθ(γ)
∂γ
=
θ − bθ(γ)
[γ + (c+λ)α − bθ(γ)] < 0. (87)
∂θ
∂γ
=
1
2
> 0. (88)
∂
∂γ
[u(q∗(θ, γ), θ)− (c+ λ)q∗(θ, γ)− s∗(θ)] = 2θα− (c+ λ)
2
− 3
2
αγ. (89)
Differentiating (78) with respect to γ yields:
πγ(γ) =
Z eθ
θ
µ
2θα− [c+ λ]
2
− 3
2
αγ
¶
dθ +
∙
3α
4
γ − α
2
bθ(γ)− [c+ λ]
4
¸
[2bθ(γ)− γ − [c+ λ]
α
]
−∂
bθ(γ)
∂γ
"
α
2
[bθ(γ)]2 − α
4
µ
2bθ(γ)− γ − [c+ λ]
α
¶2
− [c+ λ]bθ(γ)# ,
which, using (87-89) simplifies to:
πγ(γ) =
α
2
³
θ − bθ´ ∙γ + (c+ λ)
α
− bθ¸ ,
which is strictly negative because the last term is positive by (86). A similar computation for
Case 3A, which is omitted, yields the required result.
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Lemma 9 The value of γ that maximizes π(γ) is, for each of the cases (2A), (2B), and (3A)
respectively:
(2A): γ∗ = γ1 = 2
r
F
α
− c+ λ
α
. (90)
(2B): γ∗ = γ2 = 2−
c+ λ
α
−
r
2− 4F
α
. (91)
(3A): γ∗ = γ1 = 2
r
F
α
− c+ λ
α
. (92)
Proof. We need to show that under the conditions in each case, bθ(γ∗) ≤ 1 and γ∗ < 1. We
first derive γ1 and γ2 from their definitions.
γ1 = 2
r
F
α
− c+ λ
α
. (93)
γ2 = 2−
(c+ λ)
α
−
r
2− 4F
α
. (94)
From (87), bθγ(γ) < 0 and therefore, bθ(γ) is maximized at γ = γ∗.
Case 2A: Fα ≤
1
4
implies that 2
q
F
α ≤ 1.
bθ(γ1) = γ1 + c+ λα = 2
r
F
α
≤ 1; (95)
and
γ1 +
c+ λ
α
≤ 1⇒ γ1 ≤ 1. (96)
Case 2B: Fα >
1
4
, bθ(γ2) = 1 by definition. For γ2, we know that s∗(1, γ2) = bs(1) by definition.
From (91), it follows that
1
2
α− F = α
4
µ
2− γ2 −
(c+ λ)
α
¶2
, (97)
which in conjunction with the condition (α−λ−c)
2
4α <
1
2
α− F implies that γ2 < 1.
Case 3A: 2(c+λ)α ≤
q
F
α implies that
bθ(γ1) = 2rFα ≤ F(c+ λ) . (98)
The proof of γ∗ = γ1 ≤ 1 is the same as that in (2A).
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Proof of Proposition 1
This proposition corresponds to the regions of the parameter space covered by Case 1 and
Case 2B. The optimal schedule for case 1 follows directly from Lemma (3). By definition, the
optimal pricing schedule is simply
p0(θ) = α(θq0(θ)− q
0(θ)2
2
)− s0(θ). (99)
Using the expressions for q0(θ) and s0(θ) from (50) and (51) in (99) enables us to derive the
pricing function as a function of demand:
P ∗(q) =
1
4
α
µ
2
c+ λ
α
+ 2− q
¶
q. (100)
The optimal schedule for case 2B follows from Lemmas (4), (7), (8), and (9). Substituting
the optimal value γ∗ into the expressions in (4) yields
q∗(θ) = 2θ − 2 +
r
2− 4F
α
; (101)
s∗(θ) =
1
4
α
Ã
2θ − 2 +
r
2− 4F
α
!2
; (102)
p∗(θ) =
3
4
α
Ã
2−
r
2− 4F
α
− 2θ
3
!
q∗(θ). (103)
Rearranging these expressions yields the pricing function as a function of demand:
P ∗(q) =
1
4
α
"
4− 2
r
2− 4F
α
− q
#
q, (104)
which completes the proof of the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2
The region of the parameter space that this Proposition corresponds to is covered by our
cases 2A and 3A, as illustrated in Figure 6. In case 2A, from lemma 9,
γ∗ = 2
r
F
α
− c+ λ
α
, (105)
by (86), the lowest customer type that receives free usage is:
bθ = 2rF
α
(106)
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and θ = 1. The optimal schedule then follows from Lemma (4):
q∗(θ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
2(θ −
q
F
α ), θ ∈ [
q
F
α , 2
q
F
α )
θ, θ ∈ [2
q
F
α , θ]
. (107)
s∗(θ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
α
h
θ −
q
F
α
i2
, θ ∈ [
q
F
α , 2
q
F
α )
1
2
αθ2 − F, θ ∈ [2
q
F
α , θ]
. (108)
and therefore:
p∗(θ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
α[3
q
F
α − θ][θ −
q
F
α ], θ ∈ [
q
F
α , 2
q
F
α )
F, θ ∈ [2
q
F
α , θ]
. (109)
Rearranging these expressions yields the pricing function as a function of demand:
P ∗(q) =
1
4
α
Ã
4
r
F
α
− q
!
· q. (110)
An identical sequence of steps yields the same solution for case 3A, with the exception that
θ = F/(c+ λ) rather than 1.
Proof of Proposition 3
This proposition corresponds to case 3B. Define
γ3 = γ : bθ(γ) = F(c+ λ) . (111)
In contrast with cases 2A, 2B and 3A, the profit function may have up to three regions:
Region 1, when γ ≤ γ1, s∗(θ, γ) > bs(θ) for all θ, and the profit function is increasing as
we showed in Lemma(7).
Region 2, when γ1 < γ ≤ min[γ3, 1],then the demand cap is set such that all customers
of type θ > bθ are excluded. We will show that the profit function has an interior maximum in
this case.
Region 3, when γ > min{1, γ3}, s∗(bθ) = bs(bθ), the exclusion happens at θ > bθ. The
profit function is decreasing as we showed in Lemma(8). We may not have this case for some
parameter values, but that does not matter, since the solution is never in this region.
Now, in Region 2, the profit function for a given γ is
π(γ) =
eθ(γ)Z
θ
[u(q∗(θ, γ), θ)− [c+ λ]q∗(θ, γ)− s∗(θ, γ)] dθ. (112)
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Substituting the expression for quantity from Lemma (4), and then differentiating both sides
of (112) with respect to γ yields:
πγ(γ) =
³
4bθc+ 4bθλ− (γ + c+λα )2α´³bθ − θ´
4
³
γ + c+λα − bθ´ . (113)
Since bθ > θ and using (80), the sign of the RHS of (113) depends only on the sign of
f(γ) ≡ 4(c+ λ)
α
bθ − (γ + c+ λ
α
)2. (114)
Now,
f(γ1) = 4α
r
F
α
"
2
(c+ λ)
α
−
r
F
α
#
≥ 0, (115)
where the last inequality follows from the condition 2(c+λ)α ≥
q
F
α which defines case 3B. In
addition:
f(γ3) = 4
F
α
− (γ + c+ λ
α
)2 ≤ 0, (116)
where the inequality comes from the fact that square root of (86) must be positive, and
f(1) = 4
(c+ λ)
α
bθ − (1 + c+ λ
α
)2, (117)
which implies that, since θˆ < 1,
f(1) < 4
(c+ λ)
α
− (1 + c+ λ
α
)2 < 0. (118)
From (115),(116) and (118), it follows that
πγ(γ1) > 0,
πγ(min{γ3, 1}) < 0,
and therefore the optimal γ is attained in Region 2. The first order condition thus yields the
solution.
4
(c+ λ)
α
bθ − (γ + c+ λ
α
)2 = 0. (119)
Once the appropriate root of this equation is computed, the optimal pricing schedule is obtained
from Lemma 4. The last thing to derive is q(θ),
q(θ) = q(θˆ) =
γ2 − ( c+λα )2
2 (c+λ)α
. (120)
and the result follows.
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Proof of Proposition 4
The profit of the seller is bounded above by the total gross surplus from trade, or
π(θ, q) ≤ α
µ
θ · q − 1
2
q2
¶
− (c+ λ)q = α
∙
(θ − c+ λ
α
)q − 1
2
q2
¸
. (121)
The customer type which has the highest net surplus from trading is at the kink of bs(θ), which
occurs when θ =
q
2F
α .This is also the highest type for which bs(θ) = 0.
(Part: Only if) If
q
2F
α −
c+λ
α > 0, then there is gain from trading at θ =
q
2F
α and trade will
occur.
(Part: If) If
q
2F
α −
c+λ
α < 0,then for all θ ≤
q
2F
α , π(θ, q) < 0, which implies it is not
profitable to trade. Correspondingly, for each θ ∈ [
q
2F
α , 1], the optimal surplus from on-
demand computing is less than the outside opportunity of developing in-house, since the optimal
surplus increases more slowly than the outside opportunity; that is,
d
dθ
∙
α
2
(θ − c+ λ
α
)2
¸
= α(θ − c+ λ
α
) (122)
and
d
dθ
µ
1
2
αθ2 − F
¶
= αθ. (123)
The result follows.
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